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In October 2015, the largest U.S. pharmaceutical company by revenue, Pfizer,
announced plans to merge with Dublin-based giant Allergan, noting that a
primary driver of the deal is the ability for Pfizer to avoid U.S. corporate taxes.
As Pfizer explained in a press release, “the combined
company would generate more than $2 billion in savings
over the first three years and would enjoy a tax rate of 17
to 18 percent—far less than Pfizer’s current corporate
tax rate of 25 percent” as a U.S. company.1 The proposed
Pfizer-Allergan deal is one of many corporate inversions in the past two decades undertaken by companies
with the ability and size to shift profitable business lines
to offshore, tax-friendly nations. These inversions raise
important questions about the ownership of U.S. multinationals that will be addressed in this Issue Brief, based
on a previous publication by Professor Chris
William Sanchirico of Penn Law, “As American as
Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Nationality,” Tax Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 2, 2015, pp. 207274 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2394227).
A number of legislative proposals and administrative
actions have been introduced with the intent to curb the
practice of inversions, as recently as November 2015,
when the Treasury Department issued actions (building on regulatory measures established in September
of 2014) to further reduce the tax benefits of corporate
inversions. Yet the race to end inversions begs a more

SUMMARY
• Both supporters and critics of the current tax advantages enjoyed
by U.S. multinational corporations bolster their arguments with
appeals to patriotism: the MNCs and their political supporters
argue that allowing inversions or other similar arrangements
and instituting another tax holiday for “repatriating” overseas
earnings are good for the American economy as a whole;
opponents condemn these tax advantages as unpatriotic in
depriving the U.S. of enormous sums of needed revenue.
• But where, precisely, is the “home” to which profits held offshore
return? For many purposes, home is where the shareholders
are. Determining ownership of U.S. MNCs such as Apple and
GE, however, is extremely hard to do. The available data are
either incomplete or opaque.
• It is clear that the current corporate tax regime needs to be
improved. But appeals for policies that promote U.S. competitiveness by presuming U.S. ownership of U.S. incorporated
parent companies rest, in the end, on very little.
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fundamental question: When we
speak of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs), what do we mean by a
“U.S.” company? 2 More specifically, to
what extent are U.S. companies owned
by U.S. shareholders and to whom are
the tax benefits accruing? As we will
see, no one—not the U.S. government
or even the very companies benefitting
from foreign tax shelters—can truly
answer this question.
Firms that have undergone inversion or, like Apple, Cisco, GE, and
Google, that have exploited other
tax-advantaged structures such as the
“double Irish, Dutch sandwich,” do so
under the rallying cry of maintaining
their international competitiveness.3
These MNCs and their political supporters stress that being forced to pay
comparatively high U.S. tax rates in an
intensely competitive global environment places significant burdens on
their businesses—and, by implication, on the U.S. economy as a whole.
Likewise, these MNCs have lobbied
for another “tax holiday” similar to
the one they enjoyed in 2005, when
U.S. multinationals were permitted to
“repatriate” their earnings to the U.S.
at a significantly reduced tax rate: 5.25
percent instead of 35 percent. Without a tax holiday, they argue, U.S. multinationals have no incentive to bring

their accumulated overseas profits
back to the U.S., where they could be
used to hire more American workers
and suppliers.
Many stakeholders, including
politicians, taxpayers, and domestically-based U.S. businesses, wish to
reform this status quo. They see the
existing tax advantages as inefficient
and unfair—for why should large,
technology-intensive, multi-national
companies be able to avail themselves
of special tax benefits while other U.S.
businesses, by virtue of their immobility or industry, pay full freight? But
more than that, they condemn them
as inherently unpatriotic in depriving
the U.S. of enormous sums of needed
tax revenue.
However, if the argument of
U.S. MNCs is that their international competitiveness, and the U.S.
economy generally, will improve by
allowing inversions or other similar arrangements and by instituting
another tax holiday, and that these
imperatives should guide the country’s
tax agenda, it seems altogether reasonable to ask whom it is exactly these
measures would benefit. As this Issue
Brief will address in more detail, a
clear picture of the ownership of these
MNCs is extremely elusive.

IDENTIFYING WHAT
SHAREHOLDERS WANT
AND WHO THEY ARE
The appeal for corporate tax reform
often manifests itself in a campaign
for a repatriation tax holiday, or a
reduction in the tax rate for “bringing
home” the profits of U.S. companies’
foreign subsidiaries, ostensibly to
reinvest the earnings in companies’
respective workforces, research efforts,
physical capital, etc. In general, when
a U.S. parent company wishes to
extract profits from a foreign subsidiary, it must cause its subsidiary to pay
a dividend that is generally taxable to
the parent at the full U.S. corporate
tax rate of 35 percent. With such
accumulated profits in the trillions
of dollars, it is clear why a reduction
in the repatriation tax is attractive to
many U.S. MNCs.4
But where, precisely, is this “home”
to which profits held offshore will be
returning? For many purposes, home
is where the shareholders are. But
where are they?
The first step in identifying the
nationality of firm ownership begins
undoubtedly with the economic
research on “home country bias.” This
well-known academic theory documents—and attempts to explain—the

NOTES
h t t p s : / / w w w. w a s h i n g t o n p o s t . c o m / n e w s / w o n k /
wp/2015/11/23/pfizer-and-allergan-to-merge-in-160-billion-inversion/.
2 Many bills related to corporate tax reform have already been
introduced in the 114th Congress. HR 415, S 198 and S
174 all treat mergers as U.S. firms if the U.S. shareholders
maintain control of the resulting entity; HR 1809 and S 975
would keep inverted firms from receiving federal contracts,
and S 922 and HR 1790 would restrict inversions. There
have been many other similarly targeted legislative propos1

3

als in prior Congresses.
This structure describes the repositioning of highly profitable business lines of U.S. companies in foreign countries
via the incorporation of new, offshore subsidiaries with the
singular purpose of dramatically lowering corporate tax
bills. In recent years, several MNCs (notably Apple) have
reincorporated some of their most profitable subsidiaries in
Ireland, which has maintained lax tax statutes well-suited for
the exploitation of low-tax or no-tax islands like Bermuda or
the Caymans. It is critical to note, however, that the laws and

2

rules governing these loopholes are voluminous, scattered
across several countries, and constantly changing.
4 It may be helpful to think of this structure as similar to an
Individual Retirement Account (IRA). Income placed within
an IRA is untaxed upon earning, grows tax free, and is taxed,
along with the growth, upon withdrawal. The present discounted value of a total tax bill, under both the double Irish,
Dutch sandwich and an IRA, may be significantly reduced if
earnings accumulate and are reinvested over a long enough
time period.
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phenomenon that individuals tend
to overinvest in home country stocks
relative to foreign country stocks. For
example, U.S. investors invest disproportionately in U.S. stocks.
Economists have offered many
explanations for this phenomenon,
citing causes like regulatory barriers, tax disincentives, transaction
costs, foreign exchange risk, and local
risks that might be better hedged by
owning domestic stocks. But none of
these seem capable of explaining the
observed magnitude of overinvestment in home country stocks.
The explanations that seem more
viable concern corporate or national
governance risk, information asymmetry (i.e., the possibility that investors have less information concerning
companies in foreign countries), and
irrational biases, such as the possibility that unfamiliarity with a foreign
company leads to unjustified fear
of investing—although it can be difficult to distinguish between these
three explanations.
But there is a critical and overlooked point with respect to this
literature that is prevalent in the
messaging from U.S. MNCs and their
lobbyists, namely that the theory
itself does not distinguish between
a purely domestic U.S. company and

a multinational corporation. The
multi-nationality of large U.S. MNCs
presumably brings to potential foreign
investors both rationally process-able
information and irrationally processable familiarity. Do information asymmetries and feelings of unfamiliarity
apply to global companies like Apple
and Google? After all, if a citizen of
Germany, Brazil, or China wanted
to learn about home country bias,
they likely could Google it on their
iPhone. Indeed, the most accepted
explanations for “home country bias”
seem themselves to argue for MNC
exceptionalism because these firms are
“cognitively domestic,” due to their
global familiarity. Since U.S. MNCs
frequently cite the home country
bias literature as a defense of their
domestic and patriotic ownership, it
is important to know that this line of
reasoning seems particularly inapplicable to their particular situation.

often do not register directly with an
issuer. Using Wall Street parlance,
these companies often know only the
“street name,” which is to say
the name of the brokerage used by
the shareholder.
Various U.S. federal agencies do
collect data on cross-border securities
holdings, including foreign holdings
of U.S. stocks. The Treasury International Capital (TIC) system collects
data on “portfolio holdings” of foreign
residents who hold less than 10%
of any single company’s stock.5 The
Bureau of Economic Analysis, part of
the U.S. Department of Commerce,
collects data on “direct investment”
(10% ownership or greater).
The TIC reported that the portion
of U.S. equity (by value) held by foreigners in 2014 was 14.5%.6 Despite
the nearly maximal response rates to,
and the thoroughness of TIC surveys,
there are serious concerns with TIC
data.7 One such concern is so-called
“custodial bias,” which highlights the
reality that oftentimes only the country of residence of a foreign custodian
bank is recorded in the surveys, not
the country of residence of the account
owner. Furthermore, the 14.5% figure
is a ratio: foreign holdings of U.S.
equity divided by total U.S. equity. TIC
only collects data on the numerator. It

THE MISSING NUMBERS
The next recourse for breaking out
firm ownership is to do so by scratch,
using raw data. Unfortunately, this is
an exercise in futility, as the data do
not exist. The companies themselves
almost certainly do not know who
owns their shares since shareholders

NOTES
The TIC is a joint initiative of the Treasury, the Federal
Reserve, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and it
collects the majority of its data from U.S.-resident brokerdealers and custodian banks. The TIC shares some of its
data with the International Monetary Fund’s Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Surveys (CPIS), but unfortunately several economically advanced countries do not reciprocate,
including China and many Middle East oil-exporting nations,
limiting the accuracy of TIC data.
6 TIC, Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities, April 2015,
5

available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/datachart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx.
7 See note 96 in Sanchirico’s paper (http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394227) for a hypothetical
scenario illustrating TIC data limitations.
8 This industry amounts to a full 25% of all foreign holdings in
U.S. equities.
9 See notes 165-166 in Sanchirico’s paper (http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394227) for more
on mutual fund reporting.

3

Investment Company Institute, 2013 Investment Company
Fact Book, available at https://www.ici.org/pubs/fact_books.
11 U.S. Treasury department, Office of Financial Research,
2013, available at http://financialresearch.gov/reports/files/
ofr_asset_management_and_financial_stability.pdf.
12 The Tax Policy Center estimates in their models that shareholders bear between 60-70% of the corporate tax burden,
so the implicit assumption is that shareholders would receive 60-70% of the benefit from a repatriation tax holiday.
13 Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2
10
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would be a monumental and ultimately fruitless endeavor to attempt
to obtain data for the denominator on
the same basis as the numerator, and
therefore this is not done. The results,
then, can be assessed quite fairly as
crude estimates. Finally, in the TICdenominated industry, “Capital Markets (including Mutual Funds),” the
TIC is unable to identify and separate
the domestic owners from the foreign
owners of U.S. equities underlying the
mutual fund holdings reported in their
surveys.8 In other words, there is fund
opacity. The combination of TIC data
limitations and fund opacity make it
nearly impossible to determine the
ownership of large U.S. MNCs.
There are, however, more data
sources to evaluate. Googling “Who
owns Google?” provides some useful information from SEC Form 13F
about the “ownership” shares of large
institutional investment managers
(IIM) in the company. But there are
significant 13F reporting gaps that are
not immediately clear when looking a
table of IIM shares on Yahoo! Finance
or NASDAQ. For a company like
Apple, that represents a roughly 40%
reporting gap (as of March 2015).
Also, as it turns out, the enforcement
of 13F reporting is relatively weak
compared to TIC reporting. None

of this finally matters, as Form 13F
was designed to reveal the portfolio
choices of large portfolio managers,
not characteristics like the nationality of the ultimate owners. The IIM
reports merely the total holdings of
a given stock across all the funds and
accounts over which it has investment discretion. It does not reveal
the nationality of those for whom it
managing investments.
The SEC administers two other
sources of potentially useful data for
determining the foreign ownership
share of large U.S. MNCs. The first
of these two reporting regimes is for
registered management investment
companies, or mutual funds, on Forms
N-Q and N-CSR. The second is for
registered investment advisers (RIA)
on Forms ADV and PF. While it is
not unreasonable to assume that U.S.
mutual funds have predominantly
U.S. ownership,9 there appears to be
a significant amount of ownership of
U.S. equity that is not accounted for
by U.S. mutual funds – about 72%,
according to the Investment Company
Institute, the national association of
investment companies.10 As for registered investment advisers, Form ADV
requires only that they list their total
“regulatory assets under management
(AUM),” a single figure represent-

NOTES
(Apple Inc.): Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 35-37, 152-91 (2013),
available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/
investigations/hearings/offshore-profit-shifting-and-the-ustax-code_-part-2.

4

ing both domestic and foreign clients
that includes stocks, bonds, and other
types of securities.
Additionally, RIAs tend to
manage a substantial amount of
their regulatory AUM in “separate
accounts” available to wealthy individuals and large institutions. A recent
Treasury report found that about 43%
of assets managed by RIAs reside
in these separate accounts, which is
problematic for our present purpose.
Not only do the top five asset management companies alone manage
$5.5 trillion in separate accounts, but
also data for separate accounts are
not reported publicly.11 Then there is
the issue of private funds, inclusive of
hedge funds, private equity funds, and
venture capital funds. According to
the Treasury, these appear to be about
half the size of separate accounts in
terms of regulatory AUM. The DoddFrank Act required RIAs to release a
wealth of insightful information about
private funds, including the foreign
status of fund ownership. Unfortunately, little is revealed about a fund’s
actual portfolio.
The final potential source of
foreign ownership data comes from
tax reporting and arises in connection
with the tax paid by foreign investors on U.S. company dividends. The
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This figure highlights the percentage of sales broken down by geography—U.S. sales (blue bars) and non-U.S.
sales (red bars)—of the ten U.S. MNCs with the greatest amount of earnings held outside the U.S. as of 2012.
The dollar values associated with each of these companies (X axis) represents their respective amount of foreign
profits reinvested indefinitely. The Average bars on the far right of the graph describe the average sales of only
these ten companies. They are provided simply to demonstrate the variability of estimates that one could use
as a proxy for international ownership of U.S. MNC stocks, based on takeaways from the home country bias
literature presented in this Issue Brief. For instance, given the familiarity of these ten companies overseas, in addition to the absence of precise shareholder ownership data outlined throughout this piece, an argument equally
valid and likely equally flawed could be made to support an assumption of 57% foreign ownership of U.S. MNC
equities. Compared to estimates from the TIC, this is a substantial difference.
Sources: Foreign profits data can be found in Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code – Part 2 (Apple Inc.):
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th Congress, 35-37, 152-91 (2013); Sales data by geography gleaned from each company’s
most recent 10-K, as of December 14, 2015.

tax in question is remitted by the U.S
payor of the dividend rather than the
foreign payee, hence the more common name of this tax: the withholding tax. For every foreign payee each
year, a U.S. withholding agent (e.g., a
commercial bank or a brokerage firm)
must file a Form 1042-S listing the
dollar amount of dividends paid to
such a payee during the year. At this

ship question, and none offers answers
serendipitously.

A HEALTHY
BRAINSTORMING EXERCISE
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FIGURE 1: SALES OF THE 10 COMPANIES WITH THE GREATEST FOREIGN
PROFITS, INDEFINITELY REINVESTED (2012)

point, it is perhaps unsurprising to
discover that problems akin to custodial bias—observed in TIC data—
plague this IRS data. Then again, it
was never the intention of 1042-S to
record the foreign ownership share of
U.S. MNCs. Many of these reporting regimes are cleverly designed and
extremely detailed, but none ever
sought to answer the foreign owner5

Given all of the data limitations
detailed above, consider this question:
can it be said with reasonable confidence that at least 50% of shareholders
of large U.S. MNCs are U.S. citizens?
No, it seems that it cannot. We simply
do not know. Accordingly, the U.S.
MNCs arguing for lower tax rates on
the basis of spillover benefits to the
U.S. economy make a specious case
when they assume U.S. ownership,
especially when one considers the
outcome that the United States could
receive less revenue overall, as lower
rates would apply to all domestically
domiciled businesses. The same is
true of a repatriation tax holiday. This
policy option assumes that profits will
come into and improve the U.S. economy. But what if that does not happen? Most of the repatriated profits
may well go to shareholders and not
workers, which is what happened during the 2005 repatriation tax holiday,
so knowing who shareholders are and
where they live would aid significantly
in determining which national economies will reap the greatest shares of
the earnings from another holiday.12
Moving past a nationalistic line
of reasoning based on competitiveness and acknowledging that there is
a lack of data to support the ownership claims of many large U.S. MNCs,
what remains is a basic Keynesian
question: if the goal is to stimulate
the U.S. economy, is a repatriation tax
holiday or lower corporate tax rate
the optimal solution? Why not labor
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incentives or infrastructure policies
or greater R&D tax breaks? The
burden of proof seems to rest with
those championing another holiday
or lower rates. Proponents should
be able to prove U.S. ownership, but
that is not possible under the current
reporting regime. The TIC, SEC,
and IRS would have to synchronize
their reporting requirements with the
explicit goal of seeking to answer this
question of ownership, but that is
unlikely to happen. Therefore, proxies
for U.S. ownership should be robust
if the appeal is “help us compete.”
None qualify at the moment, including the often-cited 14.5% foreignownership figure from the TIC.
It does not suffice merely knowing the percentage of U.S. equity

issued by large U.S. MNCs, on the
one hand, and the percentage of U.S.
equity owned by foreigners, on the
other. Rather, one needs information that narrows focus along both
dimensions simultaneously. Given
what we know about home country bias and how it argues against
itself in regard to MNCs, the 57%
foreign-ownership proxy implied by
the international revenues of U.S.
MNCs known to have large holdings of foreign earnings (see Figure
1) may be just as valid a figure and
just as flawed.13 The point simply is
that numbers may not offer a way
forward in this debate.

6

CONCLUSION
The current corporate tax regime
needs improvement. The structures
that large, technology-intensive companies can and do exploit through
the double Irish, Dutch sandwich
continue to allow for low-taxed
MNCs to build up their IRAs (using
the analogy from above) and benefit
from tax breaks that companies of
smaller size and/or different industry
cannot access. But appeals for policies that promote U.S. competitiveness and that rely on U.S. ownership
of U.S. incorporated parent companies rest, in the end, on very little. If
Congress decides to pick winners,
they should at least know who owns
the horses in the race.
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